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Abstract 
 
Measuring individual preferences of savers have two main motivations: to reduce the 
share of non-observed heterogeneity in explaining households’ wealth behaviors, and to 
construct more accurate tests of the theories of savings and portfolio choices.  
For France, we have constructed a unique data set, the PAT€R surveys (PATrimony 
and Preferences vis-à-vis Time and Risk), with the first survey made in 1998 by interview 
with Insee, and the following surveys conducted by Tns-Sofres via postal questionnaires: 
PAT€R-2002 focused on the transmission of preferences between parents and children; the 
three subsequent waves, PAT€R-2007-2009-2011, were conducted in May 2007 (before the 
crisis), June 2009 and November 2011, on more than 3600 households representative of the 
French population, with an important panel dimension – about 2000 households were 
interviewed at least twice, and nearly 1100 households were present in all three waves. 
Almost each survey replicates direct measures of risk attitudes as well as time preference 
found in the literature, such as the hypothetical lottery on income of Barsky et al. (1997), self-
reported 0-to-10 scales concerning the willingness to take risks in various contexts (Dohmen 
et al., 2011), or even experimental measures. Yet these measures, based upon a limited 
number of questions, suffer from serious drawbacks that are analyzed in the paper. 
This is why we have developed an alternative method of scoring in order to measure 
three types of preferences, towards risk, time, and offspring (altruism) : synthetic and ordinal 
scores of preferences are derived from the responses given to a large number of (mainly) 
simple real-life questions covering different life domains of life (consumption, leisure, health, 
investments, work, retirement, family). No single question is satisfactory by itself, but the 
idea is that if a number of questions possess a common dimension, towards risk for instance, 
this dimension will be isolated by aggregating the replies, beyond framing effects, 
measurement errors, etc.: the score obtained will then show enough internal consistency, as 
measured by psychometric tests. Ultimately, the data will thus determine how many indicators 
– if any – should be introduced for each type of preference. 
On the five surveys, this scoring method has proved very consistent and robust. 
Derived from some 60 questions, one single score of preference towards risk was sufficient in 
each wave (with Cronbach’s alpha near 0.7). As regards time depreciation, two scores were 
each time necessary, marking the contrast between the short term and impulsive choices 
(“short-term impatience”) on the one hand, and the long term and more reasoned decisions 
“time preference” over the life cycle) on the other. One single score of altruism was retained. 
he contents of these four scores are very similar from one wave to the next, as well as their 
individual determinants, their individual correlation over time, the degree of correlation 
between scores, etc. Finally, the effect of these scores on the level and composition of wealth 
are similar across surveys, in line with theoretical predictions, and more significant than those 
obtained for alternate measures of preferences which suffer, moreover, from endogeneity 
biases. 
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1. Introduction: PAT€R or how to measure savers’ preferences  
 
The aim of this article is to propose a methodology for measuring the preferences of savers 
and for testing their impact on wealth management behaviour. In addition to the interest per 
se of such a study, it also sheds light on recent concerns shared by a whole school of thought. 
Over the last few years, the measurement of individual preferences in household surveys has 
assumed growing importance in what is called “household finance” (Guiso and Sodini, 2013), 
centred around two main motivations: to reduce the share of non-observed heterogeneity in 
explaining the accumulation and composition of household wealth, and to construct more 
accurate tests of the predictions made by economic theories of savings and portfolio choices. 
To study these questions, we have access to a unique statistical source: the PAT€R surveys 
(PATrimony and Preferences vis-à-vis Time and Risk).  PAT€R is an experiment that was 
launched fifteen years ago, and the first wave in 1998 was conducted by interview in 
collaboration with INSEE (the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies). 
This first PAT€R survey of a thousand households was a complementary module to 
the “Patrimoine Insee 1998” survey, intended to supplement our information on the more 
subjective aspects of savers’ behaviour (Arrondel, Masson and Verger, 2004). The idea was to 
compare our empirical measurements of preferences, based on an original method of scoring 
using a large number of questions, with the results obtained by the standard methods: 
lotteries, Likert scales and experimental measurements. 
The ensuing waves were carried out by postal questionnaire, under the aegis of the polling 
organization TNS Sofres (see table 1). The second wave, PAT€R-2002, collected the 
information required to analyse the transmission of preferences between parents and children. 
The 2007 wave marked the maturation of our survey, allowing us to validate the contributions 
of our method of measuring individual preferences. The three subsequent waves, PAT€R-
2009-2011-2012, were conducted in May 2007 (before the crisis), June 2009 and November 
2011, on more than 3600 households representative of the French population, with an 
important panel dimension: about 2000 households were interviewed at least twice, and 
nearly 1100 households were present in all three waves. These surveys came at just the right 
time to follow the savers and also to analyse (Arrondel and Masson, 2013) the temporal 
stability of their preferences during the economic and financial crisis.  
Each PAT€R questionnaire (from 1998 to 2011) includes a series of measurements of 
preferences obtained by different methods. Some of them, the “standard” methods, are those 
usually proposed in the empirical literature. The others stem from an original approach, based 
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on a scoring procedure which we first developed for the INSEE questionnaire of 1998 and 
which has undergone successive improvements since then. The idea is to use a large number 
of questions on various areas of life to construct synthetic and consistent ordinal 
measurements for each respondent – qualitative “scores” that evaluate their general attitude to 
risk and uncertainty (rather than their precise degree of aversion to risk, loss or ambiguity, for 
example), their degree of family altruism, and their time preference for the present – in which 
the data have led us to distinguish two components: the degree of short-term impatience and 
the time discount rate over the life cycle (or conversely the degree of long-term foresight). 
Sections 2 and 3 detail the theoretical and empirical reasons that led us to adopt such a 
“heterogeneous” methodology for measuring preferences. Section 4 presents this scoring 
method, as it was first applied to the INSEE data of 1998: in particular, one single score is 
sufficient to characterise the preferences of savers with regard to risk and uncertainty, and 
likewise for family altruism; for attitudes to time, two separate scores had to be constructed, 
one for the long-term preference for the present and the other for short-term impatience. 
Section 5 describes the application of this method to the four other waves of the PAT€R panel 
and shows the surprising consistency and robustness of the results obtained: each time, four 
scores of preferences are sufficient, with contents that are very similar from one wave to the 
next; the individual determinants of the scores and the effect of these scores on the level and 
composition of wealth are comparable, etc. In addition to this robustness, exploitation of the 
successive waves of the PAT€R survey also demonstrate the superiority of our methodology 
compared with the other measures of preferences. Section 6 makes an appraisal of this 
experiment. 
 
 
2. Individual preferences and models of the saver 
 
The theoretical reference for the study of savers’ behaviour is the life-cycle model in its 
“standard” form. The saver is supposed only to derive satisfaction from the global volumes of 
his own consumption at each period in his life, and this determines his life-cycle saving. He 
can also have a motive of transmission, which is a function of his degree of “altruism” θ and 
which is assumed to be separable from his life-cycle saving.1 Wealth management choices are 
assumed to be independent (not influenced by the behaviour of others), purely forward-
looking and time-consistent. 
 
                                                
1 The form of this altruistic motive can vary: the parents may derive satisfaction from the value of the bequest 
they make (before or after tax), or they may be directly concerned by the well-being of their children. 
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2.1. The parsimony of the “standard” life-cycle model: 3 preference parameters  
More precisely, the model is based on the maximisation of a time-additive utility function U, 
where the instant utilities, ut(Ct) at period t, are discounted at a constant exponential rate 
representing the future discount rate2 δ. Moreover, since life-cycle saving is simply deferred 
consumption, which does not in itself provide any utility, intertemporal consumption 
preferences can be assumed to be homothetic: it follows that the instant utility is of invariant 
and isoelastic form, that is to say u(C) = C1−γ/(1–γ). The parameter γ represents the degree of 
concavity of u or the elasticity of the decreasing marginal utility. It is the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and can also be interpreted as the desire to smooth 
consumption over time. In an uncertain world, finally, it is assumed that the saver maximises 
his expected utility function, so that the parameter γ can be interpreted as the (constant) level 
of risk aversion; it also determines the saver’s level of prudence (i.e. his precautionary 
savings) and his level of temperance (i.e. the degree to which the presence of an exogenous 
risk – on his labour income, for example – reduces his risk-taking, notably in his portfolio 
choices). 
So the standard life-cycle model is particularly parsimonious. Wealth management choices 
are considered to depend on just three independent preference parameters, which determine 
the individual’s attitudes to risk and uncertainty, time, and children (inheritance): 
- γ determines, more precisely, the smoothing of consumption over time and attitudes to risk; 
- δ defines the reduction, for a given life expectancy, in the degree of foresight and the 
decision-making horizon; 
- θ determines the degree of intergenerational altruism. 
The effects of these preferences on wealth management choices are clear: wealth increases 
with γ (precautionary saving), decreases with δ (life-cycle and retirement savings), and 
increases with θ (savings intended for inheritance); the share of risky assets decreases with the 
aversion to risk γ. 
Often obscured, the central message of the standard model with regard to preferences is, 
however, more subtle. Although this model makes a clear separation between the preferences 
concerning risk (γ), time (δ), and children (θ), wealth management choices are highly 
dependent on the interaction between these parameters: knowing only that the individual is 
relatively tolerant to risk, or only that he is short-sighted, provides no more than limited 
knowledge; knowing that he is both at the same time – what we will call a “hot head” – tells 
us much more about his savings decisions and the composition of his wealth. So, by 
                                                
2 This future discount rate may in fact depend on the age of the individual but not on the distance from the 
present (as in the case of hyperbolic discounting). 
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combining the preferences with regard to risk and time, we can distinguish four different 
regimes of wealth accumulation (and composition) in the standard model: 
- the “Conservative investors” (high γ, low δ), cautious and far-sighted, adopt a wealth 
management profile typical of the life cycle, combining life-cycle (“hump”) saving and 
precautionary saving (Modigliani, 1986); 
- the “Short-sighted prudent” (high γ, high δ), risk-averse but short-sighted, aim at a certain 
level of precautionary saving over the medium term (target saving): they follow a “buffer-
stock” model (Carroll, 1992; Deaton, 1992) whereby they create a reserve of money to protect 
against unforeseen falls in their labour income; 
- the “Hotheads” (low γ, high δ), risk-tolerant and short-sighted, are the perfect candidates for 
“rational addiction” (Becker and Murphy, 1988) in an uncertain environment; their regime of 
accumulation has not yet been fully characterised; 
- the “Enterprising” (low γ, low δ), risk-tolerant and far-sighted, constitute the neoliberal ideal 
of the entrepreneur; the characteristics of their regime of accumulation also remain somewhat 
unclear.3 
Despite these theoretical riches, the standard model is too simple to have more than limited 
predictive power. It cannot explain the insufficient retirement saving of part of the population. 
And even taking into account the transaction costs and other imperfections of the capital 
markets, and the limited access to information, this model generates portfolios that are much 
more diversified than those observed in reality: in particular it cannot explain the loss of 
interest in life annuities, nor the limited diffusion of shares within high financial assets, which 
ought to offset the effect of transaction costs.4 
 
2.2 The limitations of more realistic non-standard models: too many preference 
parameters  
To make up for these shortcomings, but also to explain the results obtained in experimental 
economics, “non-standard” models have been developed, introducing numerous other 
preference parameters. As far as risk is concerned, these parameters most often stem from 
rejection of the expected utility model: 
                                                
3 This typology of savers can be further refined by distinguishing between the “altruists” and the “egoists” in 
each group, or by incorporating the degree of short-term impatience β, a “non-standard” parameter examined 
below, which introduces a time-inconsistent preference for the present: the Ulysses of the Odyssey is typically an 
impatient Enterprising; the impatient Hotheads (of whom Achilles in the Iliad is a good example) are 
characteristically subject to a chronic lack of money, repeated payment or credit defaults, etc. 
4 See Masson (2010a) and Arrondel and Masson (2011). 
 5 
- The degree of optimism or pessimism of the individual, according to the (non-linear) way   
he transforms the probabilities of risky events, helps, in particular, to explain “anomalies” in 
the demand for insurance.5 
- Loss aversion means that to judge the profitability of a risky financial operation, the 
individual makes his decision on the basis of a reference value −  initial wealth in the simplest 
cases − in relation to which he evaluates profits and losses differently: the disutility of a loss 
is greater (in absolute value) that the utility of an equivalent profit (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Loss aversion is a notable theoretical advance, but it requires the introduction of at 
least three new parameters of preference. 
- The aversion to ambiguity leads individuals to prefer less favourable situations when the 
probabilities of an event are not very well known: this helps to explain the low demand for 
foreign shares, but also the loss of interest in life annuities, because of individuals’ lack of 
knowledge about their probabilities of survival, which are highly idiosyncratic. 
As far as attitudes to time are concerned, the non-standard models reject above all the 
hypothesis of time-consistent choices, considering savers only to have limited rationality: 
- Quasi-hyperbolic discounting causes an additional depreciation of the immediate future, that 
is to say 1–β, which means that individuals are tempted to over-consume in the present. The 
parameter β may express either a lack of imagination and clear-sightedness, leading 
to procrastination, where people continually put off disagreeable chores or resolutions till 
tomorrow (Akerlof, 1991), or a lack of willpower and self-control, when the subject cannot 
respect the rules that he initially set for himself (Laibson, 1997).6 
- More generally, savers are considered to be victims of their emotions. Some of these can 
distort their attitude to time, like the general desire for improvement in the future (in favour of 
profiles of increasing consumption) or phenomena of expectation revealing a bias towards the 
future, such as savouring the anticipation of a happy event that one defers, or dreading a 
painful experience that one seeks to be done with as quickly as possible. Other emotions are 
held to be responsible for a systematic aversion to divestiture (the endowment effect) or a 
retrospective over-sensitivity to irrecoverable past costs (the sunk costs fallacy), etc. 
- Even worse, savers are considered to suffer from a lack of financial education or limited 
cognitive capacities. They make “mistakes” of all kinds: of calculation, strategy, and 
anticipation in the gathering and processing of information or in the formation of their beliefs: 
non-Bayesian revision, overconfidence in their judgement, inability to plan for the long term, 
                                                
5 Individuals are not risk-neutral for small risks, contrary to the predictions of the expected utility model, which 
has linear probabilities. 
6 Contractual (blocked) savings would have more success with these impatient individuals (high β) who are also 
far-sighted (low δ): they would like to impose some discipline on themselves, make a pre-commitment, by 
temporarily freezing some of their assets or binding themselves to regular payments. 
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etc. Even more than quasi-hyperbolic discounting (parameter β), these different “biases” 
highlighted by behavioural economics could explain an inadequate preparation for retirement. 
In addition, decisions may be too dependent on framing effects or mental accounting, where 
individuals impose constraints on their spending by allocating their resources to different, 
relatively non-fungible mental accounts, for example “current income”, “current wealth” and 
“future income”, with decreasing marginal propensities to consume (Shefrin and Thaler, 
1988). 
In terms of the practical measurement of savers’ preferences, these “non-standard” theoretical 
developments raise two substantial difficulties.  
Firstly, and especially in terms of risk, the theory proposes to take into account an excessive 
number of parameters of preference – of which the list given above is far from exhaustive. 
These parameters all appear to be relevant, but their empirical estimation requires very 
particular and often over-abstract conditions, with the risk of increasing measurement errors 
or obtaining results that cannot be exploited; in this respect, the financial incentives offered in 
experimental economics are of limited assistance. 
Secondly, even the most sophisticated non-standard models have difficulty explaining the 
most striking stylised facts of wealth management choices. And we are not talking about the 
behaviour of experienced investors here, but that of “ordinary” French savers, which is 
characterised in particular by:  
(i)  notoriously insufficient retirement savings in nearly one in four cases;  
(ii)  a loss of interest in life annuities, which remain, despite their imperfections, a 
profitable product in the context of life-cycle saving; 
(iii) limited diffusion of risky products like shares. 
For these three criteria, the non-standard models do, admittedly, perform much better than the 
standard version: they can explain certain cases of insufficient retirement saving, and they 
predict the much lower amounts possessed in the form of life annuities or shares. But they are 
incapable of explaining the low levels of accumulation in households with relatively high 
cognitive capacities, qualifications and incomes. Above all, they cannot really explain why a 
large majority of households possess neither life annuities nor shares (Masson, 2010a). Thus, 
only 15% of French households are direct owners of shares today, and this cannot always be 
blamed on transaction costs, because the figure remains low even among highly-educated 
households and those with high (financial) wealth. Of course, the unfavourable economic 
climate, which reduces household expectations on future share prices, partly explains why 
there is such a low proportion of shareholders among households;7 but this proportion has 
                                                
7 The second part of this text deals precisely with changes in expected asset prices during the current crisis (May 
2007 to November 2011). 
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never risen above one quarter, even during periods of stock market prosperity and economic 
growth. 
 
2.3. The limitations of theory call for an empiricist method of evaluating preferences 
These two shortcomings of the theory – the profusion of preference parameters that are 
difficult to isolate and the inadequacy of model predictions – mean that any questionnaire 
aiming to “collect the necessary information to carry out a [complete?] reliable quantitative 
and multidimensional evaluation of investors’ preferences” is doomed to failure from the 
moment one considers the wealth management choices of all French savers.8 This justifies our 
choice of a less ambitious and above all more empiricist method of measuring 
preferences, from two points of view: 
(1) We only seek to evaluate three “types” of savers’ preferences, relating to risk or 
uncertainty, time and children, without concerning ourselves too much about what it is the 
questions asked about attitudes to risk, for example, actually evaluate: risk aversion in the 
strict sense of the term, the degree of caution or temperance (in the context of expected 
utility), aversion to loss or ambiguity, the level of pessimism/optimism, etc.  
(2) The complexity and diversity of the phenomena to be measured requires a considerable 
number of questions to be used at the outset, in order to determine ex post, for each type of 
preference, the number of different indicators to be introduced according to the respondents’ 
answers rather than theoretical a prioris. Ultimately, it is the data that decide: they might just 
as well show that the relevant distinction in terms of risk lies not in the contrast between 
aversions to risk, loss and ambiguity, but in the subjects’ differing reactions to small risks and 
large risks, in which case the replies to essential and non-essential decisions could not be 
treated on the same level. 
 
 
3. The usual measures of preferences are unsatisfactory 
 
Today, the economic literature proposes a wide variety of measures of preferences concerning 
risk. The range of estimations of time preferences is more limited. But very few studies 
evaluate both types of preferences at the same time, despite the fact that combining them 
provides much more information about wealth-management behaviour (see above). Lastly, 
the degree of family altruism is generally not taken into account. 
                                                
8 And yet this is the declared ambition of Palma and Picard (2012), from whom the above quotation is drawn 
(translated from the French). 
 8 
These measures can be differentiated according to whether the information gathered is based 
on surveys of households or experimental data. The measurements obtained in surveys have 
the advantage of concerning large, representative samples but – and this issue has provoked 
debate – they do not involve any financial incentives. Many of them were collected during 
certain waves of the PAT€R survey; they often aim to evaluate a type of preference, 
concerning risk or time, rather than identifying a specific preference parameter, such as loss 
aversion, for example. 
Directly inspired by theory, experimental studies generally take the form of hypothetical 
choices (between lotteries, for example) that are calibrated to measure a clearly-defined 
preference parameter. The disadvantage is that these questions are often complicated and 
abstract and only cover small samples. Experimental measures, even combined with financial 
incentives, also raise the issue of the transposition of behaviour between in vitro and in 
vivo data: this crucial problem is already present in the case of attitudes to risk, but we will 
see that it is even more acute in the case of time preferences, because it is so difficult to 
reproduce real-life time in the laboratory. 
We will start by looking at the measures of attitudes to risk. They can be differentiated 
according to the area of life considered. Those directly concerning financial investments are a 
priori the most relevant, but their effects on the accumulation and composition of wealth 
suffer from obvious endogeneity biases. Others focus on different areas, such as income, 
health or sport. Others are meant to be more synthetic, either by considering the life of the 
individual “in general” or by summarising the answers to a series of questions relating to 
particular domains, in the manner of psychological questionnaires (Weber et al., 2002).9 
We will then look at how the usual measures of attitudes to time are much more fragile, due 
to the difficulties raised by the very concept of preference for the present, which is generally 
misunderstood. This preference, which directly compares today’s satisfactions with those of 
tomorrow, is of a “higher order” because it concerns the ends pursued: expressing the 
particularity of human subjectivity, it decreases with the scope and scale of the saver’s 
projects which give meaning and substance to his existence and thereby determine one’s 
relation to one’s future self. 
 
3.1. The Barsky et al. (1997) lottery involving career choices 
The most well-known and widely-used measure of attitudes to risk is that first proposed by 
Barsky et al. (1997). It is based on hypothetical choices of lotteries concerning the 
                                                
9 This approach presupposes the stability of attitudes to risk in different domains: is there some kind of “general 
behavioural disposition” with regard to random situations, more or less independent of the domain considered? 
Or should we, on the contrary, emphasise the substitution between risks, which explains why a saver who has 
chosen a “risky” profession might “moderate” the risk-taking in his wealth management. 
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individual’s permanent income. Each subject is offered different employment contracts in 
place of his current one,10 generating a life-cycle income of R: for example, a contract where 
he has a 1/2 probability of doubling that income and a 1/2 probability of only earning λR 
(λ<1). 
In the standard framework of expected utility, an individual with an isoelastic utility function 
V, with elasticity γ, will prefer to keep his income R if and only if: 
1/2V(2R) + 1/2V(λR) ≥ V(R). By varying the value of λ, it is then possible to deduce an 
interval for the relative risk aversion γ : for example, if the individual refuses the contract for 
λ=2/3 but accepts it for λ=4/5, then the value of γ  lies in the interval [2; 3,76[. 
The hypotheses of the standard model may be unrealistic, but there is no reason why we 
should not interpret the measurement as a qualitative indicator of the general attitude towards 
risk rather than a quantitative evaluation of relative aversion in the strict sense of the term. 
What is important is that the method allows classifying individuals into four or six categories, 
from the most risk-tolerant to the most risk-averse. 
In the first wave of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 1992, about two-thirds of 
American households (aged 50 years old or more) were classified in the most risk-averse and 
about 12 % in the most risk-tolerant category. Risk tolerance fell substantially with age and 
was higher for men than for women.11 This variable helps to explain risky behaviour 
(consumption of tobacco or alcohol, self-employment, demand for insurance and risky assets, 
etc.) statistically, but its explanatory power remains fairly weak. 
This lottery has been the subject of numerous criticisms. It only concerns the domain of 
professional life, and it depends on the current situation of the respondent, especially the level 
of risk in his financial portfolio (substitution of risks). The questions asked, based on a 
hypothetical situation, are too abstract and artificial (10 % of the sample refused to participate 
in the lottery). And lastly, the answers are unstable and subject to a lot of noise, with a rank 
correlation of only 0.27 for the same individuals in the first two waves of the HRS (1992 and 
1994). However, replication of the lottery in the different waves of the HRS has made it 
possible to control for these estimation biases and to obtain ex post corrected measures that 
are much more reliable and better at explaining risk behaviour (see Appendix 1).12 
 
                                                
10 The initial wording of the American HRS (in 1992 and 1994) simply asked the subjects to choose between the 
contracts proposed. To avoid status quo bias, due to the fact that some individuals are reluctant to change jobs, a 
different form of questioning was drafted for subsequent waves: the subjects were asked to imagine they were in 
a situation where they had to move for health reasons and therefore to change jobs. 
11 Barsky et al. (1997) also showed that risk tolerance varies with race and religion: “Whites are believed to be 
the least risk tolerant. Blacks and Native Americans, at the same time, are somewhat more risk tolerant, whereas 
Asians and Hispanics are the most risk tolerant” (p. 550); in terms of religion, Protestants are the least and Jews 
are the most risk-tolerant, with Catholics occupying a position about halfway between the two. 
12 However, the greater risk tolerance of better-educated respondents may be partly due to their greater ability to 
understand complicated questions – a bias that is difficult to correct (see Borghans et al., 2008). 
 10 
3.2. Likert-type scales of risk 
Other measures are based on self-reported scales where the subjects are asked to evaluate 
their propensity to take risks on a scale of 0 to 10. This method is quite widely used and easy 
to implement in surveys. These scales can be defined “in general” or concern specific areas of 
life, such as health, sport and leisure activities, professional, financial, etc. Purely subjective, 
they measure an undifferentiated attitude to risk. However, the subjects do not have any 
points of reference or their evaluation: thus, the figure “5” can mean very different things to 
different individuals, in the absence of detailed ‘vignettes’. 
In particular, this method was used on German data by Dohmen et al., (2011) and 
Ziegelmeyer (2010). Older subjects and women were found to be less tolerant to risk. Scales 
of risk allow explaining a whole range of behaviours related to risk, from the consumption of 
tobacco to the choice of portfolio, and from the practice of sport to the choice of professional 
activity. Dohmen et al. (2012) obtain a positive correlation between the replies of parents and 
the replies of their adult children. 
 
3.3. Measures of risk based on hypothetical financial choices 
Other subjective measures are drawn from simple ad hoc questions concerning financial 
strategies or choices, risky or not. They date back to the 1983 wave of the American Survey 
of Consumer Finance (SCF), in which individuals were asked to choose between several 
different investment options, ranging between “taking substantial financial risks expecting to 
earn substantial returns” and “not willing to take any financial risks”. More recently, similar 
questions have been proposed by Iezzi (2008) and Guiso and Paiella (2008) on Italian data, 
Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) in the Netherlands, and Weber et al. (2013) in Great Britain. 
The measure of Iezzi (2008) is an indicator of risk aversion that distinguishes four groups of 
investors on the basis of a series of risk-return trade-offs on assets like in the American SCF. 
This indicator explains the probability of owning risky assets. In the same vein, Guiso and 
Paiella (2008) built a measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum amount that 
Italian subjects were prepared to invest in a risky asset with the same probability of yielding a 
given capital and of losing everything. They found that absolute aversion decreases with the 
individual’s level of resources but does not depend on his other characteristics. Furthermore, 
exposure to income risk leads subjects to invest less in the risky asset, revealing temperance 
behaviour (substitution of risks). 
Kapteyn and Teppa’s (2011) synthetic measure is based on the subjects’ answers on scales 
from 0 (“complete disagreement”) to 7 (“complete agreement”) to questions about 
investment, such as: “I want to be certain that my investment is safe” or “I would never 
consider investments in shares because I find this too risky”. Likewise, Weber et al. (2013) 
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evaluate the attitude to risk of Barclays Bank customers based on Likert scales, graduated 
from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”), in response to questions such as: “I am a 
financial risk-taker” or “It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment”. 
This type of questioning is less artificial, but it raises two problems. The first, of a theoretical 
nature, is that the measure, which concerns a generic attitude to risk, cannot be matched to 
any precise preference parameter in the models – the very limitations of the theory explain 
this imprecision. The second problem is more troublesome: a measure based on financial 
questions is obviously subject to endogeneity biases when it is used to explain wealth 
management choices. Despite these biases, Kapteyn and Teppa conclude that their measure of 
attitudes to risk has greater explanatory power than the lottery of Barsky et al. (1997) for 
explaining the demand for risky assets.13 
 
3.4. Experimental measures of risk preferences  
Lastly, experimental measures are becoming more and more popular because they are 
obtained from lottery choices with real financial incentives – “live” conditions. They also 
allow for better control of “wording” effects and framing effects. Moreover, they measure a 
priori a specific preference parameter drawn directly from the theory (risk aversion in the 
strict sense of the term, loss aversion, aversion to ambiguity, etc.).  
Most often, experimental measures of risk aversion in the form of prize lotteries are based on 
the kind of procedure proposed by Holt and Laury (2002): the choice between a certain gain 
and a risky lottery is repeated, gradually increasing the prize until the subjects choose the 
lottery. Dohmen et al. (2011) use this procedure on a subsample of the German survey: they 
find a significant positive correlation between their general scale of attitudes to risk and this 
experimental measure, although the correlation is fairly weak.14 This measure does help to 
explain certain risk-related choices, but less satisfactorily than the Likert scale.15 
                                                
13 These endogeneity biases reach a peak of intensity in Palma and Picard (2012), in which the measures of risk 
aversion and loss aversion are obtained from hypothetical choices between a risk-free investment and a risky 
asset with given characteristics. Beyond the interpretation of the answers in terms of risk or loss aversion, it all 
ultimately amounts to testing the internal – “rational” – consistency of the choices made in vitro and in vivo, 
forgetting, in particular, that the aversion to ambiguity plays a central role in real behaviour. 
14 On a subsample (400 individuals) of the PAT€R-2007 survey, Cohen et al. (2010) apply a similar 
experimental measure of risk aversion, which is also positively but weakly correlated with the other measures of 
risk preferences (although more strongly with the scoring method than with scales or lotteries). The authors 
apply a similar procedure to measure the aversion to ambiguity (see appendix 1), again obtaining a weak 
correlation between aversion to risk and aversion to ambiguity: however, the explanatory power of these two 
measures on portfolio choices is weak.  
15 On a representative sample of Dutch households, the experimental study by von Gaudecker et al. (2011) 
measures four preference parameters related to risk: risk aversion, loss aversion, the Kreps-Porteus preference 
for early or late resolution of uncertainty, and the tendency to choose “at random”. All these parameters have 
explanatory power for risk choices made in the laboratory (with financial incentives), but the study has no 
information on the subjects’ real wealth management choices. 
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3.5. Measures of attitudes to time pose a conceptual problem 
Contrary to attitudes to risk, the time preference for the present in the context of the life cycle 
immediately poses a conceptual problem. For many important authors, both economists 
(Ramsey, Harrod, Sen, Tobin) and philosophers (Nagel, Rawls), a pure and rational time 
preference cannot be justified over a finite horizon like that of human existence: in other 
words, δ = 0. 
How, then, should we interpret the empirical measures of time discounting, of which the 
critical review by Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) proposes an almost 
exhaustive list, revealing the huge variation in estimations from one study to another: between 
- 6 % and 200 %? 
The measures obtained in surveys, usually econometric, rarely allow to isolate a pure 
preference for the present because they are contaminated by many other parasitic factors: for 
example, the discount factor δ must be confused neither with the interest rate (as in trade-offs 
between monetary gains and losses at different dates), nor with the marginal intertemporal 
rate of substitution in consumption; nor must the measure express the effects of future 
uncertainty – “I would rather have one today than two tomorrow, because the former is 
certain, the latter uncertain”. 
Experimental measures (with monetary incentives) are supposed to control such factors. Some 
of them have been adapted from the procedure of Holt and Laury (2002) for risk choices: 
successive choices are proposed to the subjects, gradually increasing the “reward for waiting”. 
The value of the preference for the present is then determined by the moment when the 
individual opts for the future. Dohmen et al. (2010) applied this kind of measure, which they 
related to the subjects’ cognitive capacities; Cohen et al. (2010) built a similar measure on a 
subsample of our French PAT€R-2007 survey. The rather disappointing nature of the results 
(notably the weak explanatory power for wealth management choices), stems from the fact 
that these estimations still include irrational subjective elements – emotions, framing effects, 
dread, savouring anticipation, etc. – and only concern the short term: in fact, they suffer above 
all from the virtual impossibility of reproducing real-life time in the laboratory. 
This shortcoming becomes a major disadvantage when one adopts an “existential” view of 
(rational) time preference over the life cycle, which is the only way really to justify a positive 
δ (Masson, 2010b). If, like Rawls, one adopts an external and objective view of one’s own 
life, there is no reason not to pursue an equitable or symmetrical treatment of its different 
moments – except for the probabilities of survival. In that case, a rational preference for the 
present can only be justified by the particularity of human subjectivity, which finds 
expression in one’s relation to one’s future self and in projects that give meaning and 
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substance to one’s life today (marriage, career, buying a home, the children’s education, 
retirement, etc.): “man is a project who decides himself” (Sartre). This is because the 
continuity of life (i.e. δ = 0) is not self-evident: one’s “future selves” only really exist for the 
present self if this latter currently has reasons to live, federative projects that involve these 
future selves so that he cares about these more or less distant replicas of himself, he is 
concerned about what he will become tomorrow. In this perspective, the weight α(t) attached 
to satisfactions at the date t – α(t) = e–δt – measure the extent and significance of these projects 
and can be interpreted as a sort of altruism of the present self towards the future self at time t. 
Experimental measures on temporal distances of one year at the very most have no chance of 
approaching such a conception of time preference. Subjective Likert scales, on the other hand, 
built in the same way as those for risk, where the subject is asked to evaluate himself on a 
scale ranging from 0 (“living from day to day”) to 10 (very concerned about the future”), 
provide information that is more relevant, although it may lack precision. Thus, Ameriks et al. 
(2003) use a purely qualitative question about the “propensity to plan” which provides 
indirect but usable information about the (reverse of) preference for the present; suitably 
instrumented to correct for endogeneity bias (i.e., owning wealth predisposes towards a long-
term view), this variable has non-negligible, positive effects on the levels of total and 
financial wealth in the United States. 
To sum up, the preference for the present – such as we define it – is better measured on the 
basis of a series of practical questions, directly related to the lives of the subjects, and which 
directly concern their decision-making horizon (rather than choices of the kind “one today or 
two tomorrow”). 
 
 
4. An original “scoring” method 
 
So what can we conclude about the usual measures of savers’ preferences? Firstly, few if any 
of the studies collect information simultaneously on all three types of preferences – with 
regard to risk, time and children – to estimate their respective effects on the level and 
composition of wealth.16 Secondly, the evaluations of time preference proposed in the 
literature are clearly inadequate and we have just indicated the procedure to follow to obtain 
more suitable estimations. 
                                                
16 Even studies that examine risk and time preferences at the same time are thin on the ground: Barsky et al. 
(1997) and Dohmen et al. (2010 and 2011) are exceptions, but in both cases the measures of time preferences are 
not very satisfactory. Even the recent survey by Guiso and Sodini (2012) on Household Finance only deals with 
risk preferences. 
 14 
 
4.1. No single question is satisfactory in itself: in favour of synthetic measures of 
preferences 
The different measures of attitudes to risk may be more reliable, but they also pose problems. 
The experimental measures do little to explain the wealth management behaviour of 
households in the real world. Those that address financial choices or strategies often appear to 
be artificial and their effects on wealth are tainted by endogeneity biases. But choosing, for 
want of anything better, the domain of professional life, where risk-taking is typically lower 
than in the field of financial investments, appears to be a largely arbitrary decision. And yet 
this is the approach adopted by lotteries on permanent income, the most widely-used measure, 
of which the complicated and abstract nature probably explains the high instability of answers 
by one individual over time. And finally, although they appear to speak more to the subjects, 
self-reported scales lack an objective reference point (what does the value 5 signify on a scale 
of 0 to 10?) in relation to which the survey could position itself clearly.  
In short, taken separately, none of the questions used to measure risk preferences and their 
effects on wealth is really suitable, because we do not know which area of life it is meant to 
relate to nor the general form it should take. If it is targeted on the theory, it appears to be too 
abstract and generates a vast amount of noise in the answers; if it is more practical or ad hoc, 
its interpretation remains too imprecise. Over and above attitudes to risk, this empirical 
conclusion has more general scope; it explains why our measures of preferences are based on 
a synthetic method of “scoring”. 
We have already seen that the limitations of the theory justify a method of evaluation that is 
empiricist on two accounts: (1) the measures should concern all three types of preference in 
general, relating to risk, time and children, not one particular parameter; (2) provided that the 
statistical analysis can cover a sufficient number of diversified questions, the data will 
determine how many indicators should be introduced for each type of preference. The fact 
that no single question is sufficient in itself leads us to multiply them, in two ways: 
(3) The questions will cover a wide range of areas of life, such as consumption, leisure 
activities, actual financial investments, work, family, health, retirement, etc. 
(4) The questions will be of different natures and relate to different contexts: the most 
numerous, practical or relating to everyday life and relatively easy to answer, will ask the 
subjects about their actual behaviour, their opinions or their intentions; others will concern the 
subjects’ reactions to imaginary scenarios and more abstract lottery choices. Some will be 
relatively trivial, while others will address crucial decisions. 
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4.2. PAT€R-1998 (INSEE): the development of synthetic, ordinal “scores”  
Justified by both the limitations of theory and the empirical difficulties of questioning, the 
method of measuring preferences that we have developed, doubly empiricist and synthetic, 
consists in constructing aggregate, relative scores that summarise as faithfully as possible the 
information provided by the answers of the respondents to this set of questions.17 It was 
initially developed on data for a subsample of a thousand households from the INSEE 
“Patrimoine 1998” survey, on the basis of more than one hundred questions. It was 
reproduced for the PAT€R 2002 survey conducted by TNS Sofres, with the specific objective 
of measuring the degree of intergenerational transmission of preferences, and it has been 
repeated, with minor improvements, in the last three PAT€R surveys of 2007, 2009 and 2011. 
The qualitative scores that we construct are intended to “profile” individuals according to 
their tolerance to risk, their attitude to the future and the degree of altruism towards their 
children, on the basis of questions that are practical and therefore sometimes trivial –  such as 
whether the individual carries an umbrella when the weather is uncertain, or parks illegally 
(see below). At the same time, this method has nothing to do with the quizzes in glossy 
magazines which claim to tell you “what sort of person you are” simply by using ad hoc 
criteria to classify you. The very existence of the scores we are seeking is uncertain at the 
outset. For these scores to be possible, two conditions must be satisfied: 
- firstly, a given series of questions - concerning risk, for example – must effectively possess a 
common dimension which can be obtained by aggregating the replies, beyond framing effects, 
measurement errors, etc.: the score obtained must therefore have a minimum degree of 
internal consistency, measured by psychometric tests; 
- secondly, the preference scores obtained must explain, in a significant and “reasonable” 
manner (in keeping with theoretical predictions), the wealth management behaviour identified 
elsewhere in the survey: on this particular point as on others (endogeneity bias, temporal self-
correlation, statistical properties, explanatory factors, etc.), the scores must perform markedly 
better than the usual measures based on lotteries, scales or experiments. 
A method of scoring in three stages, judged by the data 
Initially, therefore, the method tested on the first wave of the PAT€R survey in 1998 
(Arrondel, Masson and Verger, 2004) presented numerous methodological uncertainties, 
which could be found in each of its three stages: 
(i) the choice of questions and their a priori allocation to one of the three fields of 
preference, concerning risk, time or children:  
                                                
17 Our approach thus rejoins the multidimensional analysis of personality traits pioneered by psychometricians 
and recently taken up by economists, around Heckman (see Borghans et al., 2008). 
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- how many questions are needed to measure preferences and obtain scores that explain 
wealth management behaviour: 20, 30, 40, 50? It would be ideal if a small number of 
carefully chosen questions was sufficient; 
(ii)  coding the answers, for which we have chosen a system with three modes. In the case of 
the preference for the present, for example: short-sighted: −1; medium-sighted: 0; far-sighted: 
+1; the “raw” score for each individual, before validation, is then equal to the sum of the 
scores obtained for all the questions initially considered: 
- is this critical procedure of aggregating the replies into a non-weighted total optimal? 
Or should we increase the number of modes, as is usually the case in psychometric 
studies?18 
(iii) statistical validation and correction of the “raw” scores: the final scores, if they exist, are 
obtained from the corresponding raw scores by limiting the sum total to those items that are 
seen, ex post, to form a statistically consistent whole.19 A score is only satisfactory a priori if 
it presents a minimum degree of internal consistency, which is estimated by 
Cronbach’s alpha; principal component analysis (PCA), applied to all the questions envisaged 
to construct each score, can be used to verify its representativeness (see Appendix 2): 
- in a given field of preference, is it legitimate to consider the answers to trivial and 
crucial decisions, or small and big risks, on the same level, by aggregating them, or 
should separate scores be used in each case?  
- are attitudes to risk and the future sufficiently homogeneous in the different areas of 
life (health, family, work, retirement, etc.) for us to summarise them in a synthetic 
score? After all, hang-gliding and tax fraud are risky activities with very different 
motivations; and some individuals make substitutions between the risks they take in 
different areas.20 
It can be seen that the possibility of our scoring system failing could not be excluded ex ante: 
analysis of the INSEE data might well have concluded that there was no acceptable score for 
risk, for example, or far too many. But rather than condemning our method, which we have 
shown to be superior to other measures, this failure would have meant that the objective of 
estimating savers’ preferences in order to evaluate their effects on wealth management 
behaviour faced considerable difficulties: unobserved heterogeneity in this behaviour could 
still be identified (on panel data) but it would remain a black box. 
                                                
18 Sensitivity tests show that the number of modalities used in the coding system has little effect on the results 
obtained provided the number of questions considered in the score exceeds a certain threshold. 
19 Each item retained must have a minimum positive correlation with all the other questions for the score 
considered. 
20 Thus, a (French) dragster world champion declared that because he took extreme risks in his professional life, 
he was very careful in managing his wealth for himself and his family, looking after his health,  etc.  
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Choice of questions: an anthology 
By giving a few examples of the questions used in the  PAT€R-1998 survey to characterise 
risk and time preferences, we will see that none of them is satisfactory in itself, for various 
reasons.21 
The questions that characterise a preference parameter directly are too abstract: “You are 
offered the chance to buy for 500 francs a lottery ticket which has a one-in-a-thousand chance 
of winning 1 million francs. Do you buy it?” (absolute risk aversion); “Due to an 
unexpectedly heavy workload, your employer asks you to postpone one week’s holidays for a 
year, in return for an extra X days off...” (time discount rate). 
Other questions concern a type of preference, but cannot be related to a specific parameter 
(rational or not): “Has your consumption of meat changed since the problems of mad-cow 
disease?” (risk);22 “Do you agree with the following statements: “marriage is a form of 
insurance”, “deciding to have children means taking a risk” (risk); “deciding to have children 
is a life-long commitment” (time); “With regard to your young or teenage children, are you 
(or would you be) the sort of person: “to encourage them to take risks?” (risk); “to give them 
a taste for saving?” (time). 
Certain questions have been allocated a priori to more than one type of preferences, 
particularly as regards risk and time – overlapping is inevitable because the future is both 
uncertain and far-removed from the present: “Do you think it is worth forgoing one of the 
pleasures of life, in order to live a few years longer?”; “To avoid health problems, do you 
watch your weight or your diet, do you practice a sport...?”; “Instead of the current system, 
you are offered the following: a higher pension until the age of 85, but then the minimum 
social security pension after that. Would you accept?” 
Moreover, many questions dealing with everyday life pose problems in how to interpret the 
replies; because of framing effects and non-relevant factors that cannot be controlled: 
answering “yes” to the question “Do you ever park your car illegally?” tends to express a 
tolerance to risk, but a risk-loving individual may well refuse ever to park illegally through 
civic-mindedness. 
Other questions only have an indirect link with a type of preference. In terms of risk, for 
example:  “Do you ever go to a show rather at random, at the risk of being disappointed on 
occasion?”; “Are you sensitive to current health debates (AIDS, contaminated blood, etc.)?” 
                                                
21 To get a more precise idea of the content of the scores, the reader will find in Tables 2 and 3 below, the fifteen 
questions that contributed the most to the risk and time preference scores for the waves 2007 and 2009 (many of 
the questions were repeated from the 1998 wave). 
22 This question was withdrawn after 2007 because it had less relevance for the younger generations.  
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Many questions are – deliberately – so trivial that taken separately, one would not expect 
them to have any effect on the level or composition of household wealth. Thus, in terms of 
risk: “When you leave the house and the weather is uncertain, do you take an umbrella or a 
raincoat?”; or again: “When you are driving, do you ever: not wear your seat-belt... exceed 
the speed limit... go through an amber light?” However, we will see that these questions are 
among the ones that contribute the most to the risk score, and they are therefore perfect 
instruments. 
Conversely, some questions have a significant effect on the level of wealth but suffer from 
obvious endogeneity bias: “Do you ever have difficulty making ends meet?” (time); “In 
couples where there is one main money-earner, do you think that it is necessary to plan 
financially for his or her possible disappearance (by taking out life insurance or putting 
enough money aside)?”23 
So in terms of both the measurement of preferences and their explanatory power on wealth 
management choices, the questions asked suffer from obvious biases and shortcomings. The 
idea underlying the second and third stages of the scoring method is that only the “average” of 
all the replies given to a wide diversity of questions will have meaning, because this  
aggregation eliminates, globally and ex ante, the biases and parasitic measurement errors. The 
scores, which are qualitative ordinal measurements, are therefore intended to be indicators of 
a series of opinions, intentions, behaviours or reactions to hypothetical scenarios concerning 
one of the three types of preference: attitudes to risk or uncertainty; priority given to the 
present; family altruism. The third stage, of statistical validation, must then determine the 
number of different scores to be introduced for each type of preference, if such scores can 
indeed be obtained. 
 
4.3. The results of PAT€R-1998: 4 scores of preference are sufficient 
We will now summarise the results presented in an earlier issue of Économie et Statistique 
(Arrondel, Masson and Verger, 2004). 
In terms of risk, 54 of the 56 questions initially considered were kept, enabling us to construct 
a score for risk with a relatively high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.65, see Table A1). This score displays the desired statistical properties, as regards the 
projection on the first axis of the PCA (the equivalent of graph A1 for 2007-2011), the 
regularity and the dispersion of the bar chart (graph A2), and the strong correlations between 
“sub-scores” calculated for the different areas of life. Moreover, the individual determinants 
of this score (see Table 4 below) and its significant effects on the level and composition of 
wealth (the equivalent of graphs 1 and 2 for 2007-2011) go in the expected direction. 
                                                
23 This question is the only one to have been attributed a priori to all three types of preference. 
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In other words, the INSEE data led us to conclude that one single score for risk was sufficient 
to characterise numerically the attitudes towards risk and uncertainty of a representative 
sample of French savers. In view of the multiplicity of dimensions of risk highlighted in the 
literature, this remarkable result was a real surprise, the only reservation being that it may not 
apply to sub-populations of experienced investors possessing a high level of financial wealth. 
As regards the time preference for the present, on the contrary, two heterogeneous dimensions 
emerged very quickly, marking the contrast between the short term and impulsive choices on 
the one hand, and the long term and more reasoned decisions on the other. Two scores were 
retained: 
- The first measured the preference for the present over the life cycle, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.53 (Table A1), still acceptable if one bears in mind the difficulty, mentioned earlier, of 
bringing this preference closer to a “higher order”, a priori time consistent; in fact, the 
statistical properties of this indicator, its determinants and its effects on wealth satisfy the 
required criteria as in the case of the score for risk. 
- The second measured the degree of short-term impatience, which should incorporate not 
only the parameter β of hyperbolic discounting but also a time-consistent dimension linked to 
the high opportunity cost of time for certain individuals. However, this second score was 
poorly determined, with a Cronbach’s alpha of only 0.27, below the standard threshold of 
relevance (about 0.4), because of the small number of questions used (8); this score does little 
to explain wealth management behaviour. 
Finally, we retained one single score for altruism, but here again the degree of consistency 
was too weak because of the small number of questions considered; this score has significant 
effects, in the expected direction, on the level and composition of wealth. 
Bearing in mind the need to increase the number of questions in order to improve the scores 
for short-term impatience and altruism, four scores were therefore sufficient for us to 
characterise savers’ preferences. It remained for us to determine whether these indicators, in 
particular those concerning attitudes to risk and preference for the present over the long term, 
performed better than the usual measures. The answer will be given in detail below, after 
examination of the results for subsequent waves of the PAT€R panel. But let us already 
remark that the scores are much better explained by the observable characteristics of the 
surveys, and in the expected direction: for example, young people and men are more tolerant 
to risk; older and higher-qualified people are more far-sighted. Furthermore, and this is an 
original result, we were able to estimate a positive correlation between attitudes to risk and 
preference for the present: cautious individuals were more often far-sighted, and vice versa. 
But above all, the scores were relevant in explaining the level and composition of wealth, 
because they do not suffer from the same endogeneity biases as the other measures. By 
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construction, these indicators are a collection of good instruments: knowing whether an 
individual “takes his umbrella when the weather is uncertain” tells us something about his 
tolerance to risk but nothing – fortunately – about his level of wealth.24 
Applied to data from INSEE, this first experiment of measuring savers’ preferences by the 
original method of scoring was therefore an overall success. However, it calls for two 
observations. 
- The method is only reliable when a large number of questions are considered. Only keeping 
the ten questions that contribute the most to the scores for risk of time preference, for 
example, considerably reduces the performance of the indicators concerned. INSEE’s 
understandable hope of being able to measure preferences on the basis of a few questions 
incorporated into the patrimony surveys therefore proved to be wishful thinking: the ideal 
would be to have a patrimony panel available and to be able introduce a module entirely 
dedicated to the estimation of preferences into one of the waves of the survey. 
- The success of this first experiment must be put into perspective: because it is a “handmade” 
scoring method, the success of which depends entirely on the data considered, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that this success obtained on the INSEE survey was simply a “stroke 
of luck”. There is only one way to put this doubt to rest, and that is to multiply the sources of 
data on which the method can be replicated to test the robustness of the results obtained. This 
was the purpose of the subsequent PAT€R surveys, which also introduced a valuable panel 
dimension, notably to test the stability of preferences.25 
 
 
5. PAT€R-2002 to 2011: consistency and robustness of the scoring method  
 
The experiment was first repeated in 2002 with the specific project of questioning two 
generations simultaneously to analyse the intergenerational transmission of preferences. It is 
because the same questionnaire had to be presented to both parents and children that there 
were fewer questions and the scores therefore performed slightly less satisfactorily (see 
Appendix 2). Then in 2007, with a broader sample (3 800 households), the questionnaire was 
enriched with a large number of questions and an experimental part and, for some households, 
it was sent separately to each member of the couple. The experiment was repeated in 2009 
and in 2011 with an important panel dimension (about 2000 households were present in the 
waves of 2007 and 2009, the same number in 2009 and 2011, and about one thousand in all 
                                                
24 In fact, it emerged that the other measures of risk parameters (lotteries and scales), endogenous for explaining 
wealth management choices, could be instrumented by the scores in a very satisfactory manner. 
25 The scoring method could also be applied to other countries, by adapting the questions to the socio-cultural 
context of the country considered. 
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three waves) and questioning almost identical to that finally chosen in 2007, in order to 
observe the evolution in preferences and the reactions of savers during the crisis.26 
These four surveys were conducted by TNS-Sofres on a panel of volunteers representative of 
the French population. The method of questioning was different to that used by INSEE for the 
PAT€R-1998 wave, since the respondents did not have to answer an interviewer face to face, 
but fill in a questionnaire on paper and send in back by post. 
 
5.1. Still 4 scores of preference… 
Comparative analysis of the results in the different waves of the survey confirm the main 
conclusions drawn from the initial data of PAT€R-1998. More precisely, the characteristics of 
the scores obtained display remarkable consistency and robustness between one wave and the 
next: 
- The preferences of the saver can still be represented by four consistent scores: one score for 
attitudes to risk, two for time preference (short term and long term) and one for altruism. 
- The scores possess a high degree of internal consistency, at least in the four surveys (1998, 
2007, 2009 and 2011) for which the number of questions was not limited (see Table A1 in 
Appendix 2): the value of Cronbach’s alpha for the score for risk is around 0.70 with 50 to 
60 questions, which is the threshold of totally credible consistency for psychometricians; the 
corresponding value, close to 0.55, obtained for the score for time preference in these four 
surveys remains acceptable and expresses the greater difficulty in identifying this parameter 
of preference. 
- The consistency of the scores can also be visualised on the circle of correlations of the PCAs 
carried out on the waves PAT€R-2007 to 2011 (Graph A1, Appendix 2). These graphs show 
that the scores (introduced as additional variables) are projected perfectly on the first axis, 
which represents risk-taking. It is also worth noting the great similarity between the 
projections of the different questions on the first two axes. 
- Table A1 in Appendix 2 also lists the number of questions of which the different scores are 
composed. If there are too few questions, as was the case for PAT€R-2002, it is not 
possible to obtain indicators of sufficient quality.27 In the case of altruism and short-term 
                                                
26 See Table 1. The wave PAT€R 2007 allowed us to subject our scoring method to different validation tests, by 
increasing the initial number of questions to determine the optimum composition of the scores, by trying to 
distinguish different scores for risk, by introducing an experimental protocol to obtain alternative measures of 
preferences (aversion to risk and ambiguity, preference for the present and short-term impatience) that can be 
compared with the scores, etc. The questions finally retained were repeated in 2009 and 2011. 
27 The validation tests (sort of crash tests) carried out on the 2007 wave showed that although a large number of 
questions is necessary to establish reliable scores, the additional information collected above a certain threshold 
becomes marginal and only very slightly increases the internal consistency of our measures: this threshold is 
about sixty questions in the case of risk, for example. The attempts to distinguish several scores for risk, by 
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impatience, the increase in the number of items considerably improved the performance of 
the two scores between 2007 and 2011, with a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.4 for fifteen 
questions. 
 
5.2. … with the same content 
So the scoring method developed on the different waves of the PAT€R survey allows to 
characterise the saver’s preferences in 4 consistent scores. The question that remains is 
whether these indicators always measure the same thing. Several statistical observations 
suggest that this is the case, while highlighting the superiority of scores over the other 
measures of preferences:  
- The bar charts of the scores display the required properties of dispersion and regularity, and 
they are, moreover, comparable from one survey to the next (see Graphs A2 and A3 in 
Appendix 2). These properties cannot be observed in the other measures: the risk aversion 
measure based on career lotteries (Barsky et al., 1997) only has four modalities; the 
distributions obtained for the scales from 0 to 10 for time and risk preferences have chaotic 
profiles, with peaks that fluctuate in size and location between one survey and the next, 
notably in 0 and 5 (Graphs A4 and A5). 
- The “content” of the scores is remarkably constant: the rankings of the questions that are 
most relevant in explaining the scores (those that contribute the most, in the sense that they 
have the highest correlation with the rest of the score) are very similar from one date to the 
next, as Tables 2 and 3 show, for example, for the first fifteen questions in the 2007 and 
2009 waves. For the score for risk, the ranking of items that contribute the most is even 
invariant over the three years 2007, 2009 and 2011: 1. the precautions taken in the event of 
uncertain weather; 2. driving; 3. illegal parking. In the case of the score for time preference, 
the three questions concerning whether the savers (i) seek to give their children a taste for 
saving, (ii) think that retirement should be prepared for in advance and (iii) are concerned 
about their health and fitness come out top in all three surveys. 
- The time correlation of individual preferences between 2007, 2009 and 2011 for example, is 
a good indicator of the consistency of measures from one survey to the next (Table A2). The 
self-correlation of scores is by far the highest: 0.75 over two years and 0.70 over four years 
for the risk score; 0.67 over two years and 0.60 over four years for the time preference score. 
The lottery of Barsky et al. (1997), on the contrary, presents the highest variability from one 
survey to the next, with a rank correlation that does not exceed 0.30; this variability can be 
                                                                                                                                                   
separating the questions that could define a score for the aversion to ambiguity, for example, also proved to be 
fruitless. 
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explained notably by a certain inconsistency in the replies between the successive waves of 
the PAT€R survey (Table A3).28 
The similarity between the empirical properties of the scores constructed from different waves 
of the PAT€R survey testify to the robustness of the method, both at the level of their 
statistical consistency and at the level of their information content. This robustness is a 
necessary step but not sufficient. The second step consists in showing (which was the initial 
aim of the research project) that these measures allow us both to understand the savers better 
and to better explain their wealth management behaviour, the idea being to bring to light the 
constancies in these two domains from one survey to the next. 
 
5.3 Tastes and riches: the best-performing scores for explaining wealth  
A systematic comparison of the different indicators of preference shows that our synthetic 
scores perform better than the usual measures, especially lotteries and scales, when it comes 
to explaining savers’ preferences and wealth management choices: 
- “Who is what in terms of preferences?”: analysis of the individual determinants of the scores 
reveal effects of observable characteristics that are perfectly comparable between one survey 
and another and which generally go in the expected direction. Thus, men are more risk-
tolerant than women and young people are more risk-tolerant than older ones. Married 
people and children of self-employed parents are also more risk-tolerant. On the other hand, 
the idea that education favours risk-taking is only confirmed in two surveys, the two others 
not revealing any significant result (Table 4). Furthermore, as one might have expected, the 
respondents are more likely to be far-sighted (have low time preference for the present) if 
they are older, more highly-educated or living in a couple. On the contrary, the idea that 
women are more far-sighted is only substantiated in the last three waves of the survey 
(Table 5).  
- Original information from the PAT€R data, the correlations between the different scores of 
individual preferences are very similar from one survey to the next, as can be seen in Table 
6, which compares the results obtained in 2007, 2009 and 2011: for example, lower risk 
tolerance goes with greater far-sightedness, with a correlation of the order of 0.40 for the 
three dates, but also with less impatience (correlation of the order of 0.35) and stronger 
                                                
28 The numbers on the diagonal are far from being the highest except for the most risk-averse; above all, more 
than one third of the respondents who declared themselves to be very adventurous in one survey completely 
changed their opinion two years later and no longer accepted any risk. The same inconsistencies can be observed 
in the American data of Barsky et al. (1997), leading these authors to use the panel dimension (test-retest) to 
partly correct the measurement errors and noise in the replies given. 
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altruism (correlation of 0.30); the correlation between preference for the present and short-
term impatience is positive but weaker (0.20-0.25).29 
- If we apply to these scores the typology of savers obtained in the standard model by 
combining risk aversion and future discount rate, the positive correlation between risk 
aversion and far-sightedness means that the most frequent categories are the “Conservative 
investors” (cautious and far-sighted) and the “Hotheads” (risk-tolerant and short-sighted). 
The other types of savers, “Short-sighted prudent” and “Enterprising” constitute more 
original profiles. From the first wave of the survey (PAT€R-1998), we verified that 
combining the preferences noticeably improved their explanatory power on wealth 
behaviour (Arrondel, Masson and Verger, 2005): all else being equal, the “Conservative 
investors” accumulate substantially more than the others; conversely, the “Hotheads” 
possess less retirement savings than the others, and the ownership of shares appears to be 
weakest in the category of “Short-sighted prudent”. 
- The quantitative effects of the scores on savings and portfolio choices are more significant 
than for the other measures and also very comparable from one survey to the next. Thus, the 
specific effect of the score of preference on the levels of total or financial wealth is 
significant and comparable in 2007, 2009 and 2011: between the first and last quartiles of 
the score distribution, financial wealth is multiplied by a factor of about 2 (Graph 1). The 
same is true for the specific effect on the possession of diverse assets which is obtained for 
an increase of one standard deviation between the different scores. As one might expect, 
lower risk tolerance has the strongest negative effect on the possession of shares: the 
probability of holding these assets, on average 18 %, falls by the same percentage in the two 
surveys, between 3 % and 4 %. Preference for the present has the strongest negative effect 
on life insurance and retirement savings. Altruism firstly favours the possession of life 
insurance. Lastly, home ownership and savings accounts decrease with risk tolerance and 
preference for the present (Graph 2). 
Remember that these effects of scores on the level and composition of wealth have the 
decisive advantage of not suffering from the same endogeneity biases as the other measures of 
preference: by construction, the scores are synthetic indicators that largely resemble a 
collection of “natural instruments”. 
 
5.4. Prolongations: preferences and families  
Several waves of the panel PAT€R allow to compare preferences within families, as in the 
most accomplished surveys outside France: Dohmen et al. (2012) on German data for self-
                                                
29 The correlations calculated on the INSEE data of 1998, obtained by interview rather than postal questionnaire, 
are perfectly comparable. Note that all these correlations concern “disconnected” scores, where common 
questions have been attributed to one single score (the one to which they make the strongest contribution). 
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reported scales from 0 to 10; and above all Kimball et al. (2009) on American data using the 
lottery on career choices. In PAT€R-2002, we questioned two generations in order to compare 
the preferences of parents and children; in PAT€R-2007, we presented the same questionnaire 
separately to the two spouses in the household. 
“Like father like son”: the intergenerational transmission of preferences 
In PAT€R-2002, the same questionnaire was presented to a sample of parents and children 
(410 pairs). This source thus supplied information on wealth and subjective characteristics for 
two coexisting generations. 
We obtained positive intergenerational correlations, all else being equal, for the three scores 
of the attitude to risk, time preference and family altruism (Arrondel, 2009). The correlation 
was strongest for risk, between 0.22 and 0.30 depending on the populations considered; the 
correlation for time preference lay between 0.15 and 0.20; that for altruism varied between 
0.11 and 0.20. Therefore, beyond the influence of the social context, religion, education, etc., 
there does indeed exist a specific effect of the family context, expressed in a significant 
heritability of preferences. 
If we consider risk aversion as measured by the lottery of Barsky et al. (1997), on the 
contrary, the replies given by the two generations of the families questioned do not allow us 
to identify any significant correlation. Evidently, this measure has from too much noise.30 
Birds of a feather? 
Do men who are more risk-tolerant have spouses who are more risk-tolerant? Is the same true 
for other dimensions of individual preferences? In other words, do both members of a couple 
share the same values? The PAT€R-2007 survey allows us to shed some light on this 
question, as yet little discussed. In this survey, the same questionnaire was sent to each spouse 
(with a period of time between the two) for about one thousand volunteer couples (905 
replies). 
We observed a similarity between spouses in terms of attitudes to risk, whatever the 
indicators of preference used (Arrondel and Frémeaux, 2013). The “raw”, positive and 
significant correlation between individuals ranges between 0.20-0.30 for the lotteries and 
scales to 0.50 for the scores. This homogamy can also be observed in the preference for the 
present, with raw correlations of the same order. 
Econometric analysis shows that this homogamy in terms of psychological profiles remains 
relevant even when we take into account other individual characteristics of the spouses such 
                                                
30 The measures of preference based on self-reported scales are not available for the 2002 survey. The only 
intergenerational study to use such scales, for risk and trust, is the German study by Dohmen et al. (2012): these 
authors obtain positive, significant but limited correlations between the scales of the parents and those of the 
children. 
 26 
as age, social position and origin, religion, etc.: the values of the correlations hardly change. It 
remains to determine whether this similarity in preferences is the result of an initial selection 
process or of homogenisation over time due to mutual influence. The fact that the correlations 
observed are as high in recent couples as they are in more long-established couples suggests 
that the former explanation is more relevant: from the perspective of savings preferences, 
choice of spouse really is a matter of taste. 
 
 
6. A brief assessment of our scoring method 
 
At the end of this long journey, it is reasonable to conclude that our scoring method is an 
overall success. This success is all the more notable since it was so uncertain at the outset, as 
we have explained: the data of the 1998 INSEE survey could have invalidated the method by 
showing that it is impossible to construct a limited number of preference scores with 
sufficient internal consistency and satisfactory explanatory power on wealth management 
behaviour. 
With hindsight, the success of the method is based on two pillars: 
- the procedure of aggregating the replies to highly disparate questions to produce synthetic 
ordinal scores, representative of all the respondent’s answers; 
- the remarkable robustness of the results obtained in five different surveys, which concerns a 
wide variety of tests, including criteria as precise as the ranking of questions that contribute 
the most to each score (Tables 2 and 3) or the degree of correlation between different 
preference scores (Table 6). 
 
6.1. The key role of aggregating the replies to diverse questions 
We have seen that no single question posed is satisfactory, leading to replies that contain 
numerous biases and errors of various origins. However, as long as a set of questions presents 
a common dimension, concerning the attitude to risk, for example, then this attitude can be 
isolated by aggregating the replies, provided that this produces a score with satisfactory 
internal consistency. In this case, the scoring method and psychometricians wager that the 
procedure of aggregation, suitably performed and controlled, can eliminate ex ante the noise 
from the replies given by the respondent. 
The alternative, much more familiar to economists, consists in eliminating ex post the 
estimation biases and other noise from the measurements through repeated evaluations (test-
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retest), for example in long panel data: this is what Kimball et al. (2008 and 2009) did with 
American data on the income lottery (see Appendix 1). As in our survey, a single evaluation 
calculated from this lottery, in four or six modalities, gives unsatisfactory results. However, 
econometric corrections - made possible by repeated evaluations for the same individuals - 
produce a measure of risk tolerance that performs much better. It can also be noted that the 
two approaches – our scoring method for risk and the lottery corrected for measurement 
biases – lead to convergent conclusions both for the correlations between spouses or between 
parents and children in terms of their attitudes to risk and for the stability of this preference 
over time. 
For example, Kimball et al. (2009), estimate a correlation of 0.41 between spouses, 0.23 
between a child and his mother and 0.14 between a child and his father for this preference: 
these values are comparable to those obtained with the score for risk on French data between 
spouses or between parents and children. 
Without being able to draw definitive conclusions, it therefore seems that one can establish a 
certain equivalence between the correction of noise ex ante using a psychometric procedure, 
or ex post using an econometric procedure. At the same time, each method has its downside: 
ours requires a large number of questions; that of the American authors requires a long panel. 
 
6.2. How to interpret the robustness of our scoring method? 
Established over five surveys with partly very different data sources (INSEE vs. TNS Sofres), 
the robustness of our scoring method is verified according to several different criteria: the 
number of scores, their internal consistency index, the numbers of questions retained and 
most relevant items, correlation between the scores, the explanatory power of these 
exogenous indicators on household wealth behaviour, etc. The method is therefore tried and 
tested. But the most interesting use of this robustness lies in the future. The fact that the 
method’s success depends closely on the data used is no longer a weakness but a valuable 
asset. 
Let us suppose that another wave of the PAT€R survey is carried out next year, under the 
same conditions as those of 2007, 2009 and 2011, with the same questioning and comparable 
data reliability. And let us imagine that this time, the scoring cannot be applied in the same 
way: several different scores need to be distinguished for risk, or worse, it is no longer 
possible to construct a satisfactory risk score for part of the population. This failure would be 
very instructive: given the success and robustness of the method on previous surveys, it would 
be evidence of a structural change in the behaviour of savers: not only would the crisis have 
changed the world in which individuals operate, making it appear more uncertain and instable 
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to them, but over time it would have seeped into their psyche, altered their identity, modified 
their decision-making mindset.31 
 
                                                
31 This change would be all the more remarkable since, as Arrondel and Masson (2013) showed, savers’ time and 
risk preferences remained generally stable from May 2007 through to November 2011. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The experiment based on the lottery of Barsky et al. (1997) was repeated while slightly 
varying the questioning (more contracts proposed, titles changed) in successive waves of the 
HRS panel from 1994 to 2002 (every two years except 1996), thus allowing a subsample of 
subjects to be followed over time. 
Kimball et al. (2008) used this information to correct the noise in the (continual) measure of 
risk aversion econometrically. This noise stems from a status quo bias which encourages 
individuals not to want to change jobs and therefore to opt for the safe choice, an individual 
error that is systematic in the replies to different waves and transitory in the choices of each 
wave. Taking into account these errors brings to light the significance of the initial bias: the 
corrected risk tolerance is 11 % higher than the original measure. Furthermore, using this 
measure of risk aversion corrected for different biases increases its explanatory power on the 
demand for risky assets and decreases that of the other correlated factors (gender and 
education, in particular). 
Beauchamp, Cesarini and Johannesson (2011) draw the same conclusion on Swedish data 
with the same measure of risk aversion: a retest on a subsample of individuals (500 out of 
11000) shows that the correction of measurement errors (transitory variation) considerably 
increases the explanatory power of the lottery on risky behaviour. Moreover, the econometric 
relation between risk aversion and individual determinants is stronger with the corrected 
variable. Likewise, the correlation of preferences between brothers and sisters is stronger. 
Sahm (2008) uses the HRS data to study changes in risk preferences over time (by “stacking 
up” the 18 600 replies of some 12 000 people). As before, the results show strong individual 
heterogeneity in risk tolerance (notably according to gender, ethnic origin or religion) and 
systematic changes over time such as age (decrease) and favourable macroeconomic changes 
(increase). On the other hand, the other changes in individual situations (unemployment, 
divorce, illness, etc.) do not affect the disposition towards risk.32 Finally, contrary to 
systematic variations, the largest share of transitory variation in replies to the lottery remains 
unexplained. Individual risk preferences are therefore found to be stable. 
Kimball et al. (2009) use the 1996 wave of the American PSID, the questionnaire of which 
includes the same lottery. They find a strong age effect, this time estimated on the whole 
population. Moreover, since all the members of a same family were questioned, they obtain 
                                                
32 This result contradicts the more recent results of Guiso et al. (2011), who draw on the instability of replies to 
the lottery before and after the crisis to conclude that Italian savers have become more risk-averse. This 
reduction in risk tolerance, which cannot be explained by changes in the economic situation of the individuals, is 
attributed to “fear”. If confirmed, this effect would tend to show above all that this question is sensitive to 
passing emotions and therefore subject to instability. 
 32 
interesting new correlations for risk aversion: the correlation is positive and significant 
between spouses (0.41), between brothers and sisters (0.48), and between children and each of 
the parents (0.23 with the mother and 0.14 with the father). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Numbers of items and consistency index of preference scores 
Table A1 presents, for each wave of the PAT€R survey and for each preference parameter 
(risk, time preference, altruism and impatience), the number of questions retained in the 
scores from among all the questions used in the questionnaire, together with the internal 
consistency index – Cronbach’s alpha.  
The score is most consistent for the attitudes to risk, since it is close to 0.70 in all the waves 
except PAT€R-2002, where the number of available questions was much lower, in view of 
the difficulty of the exercise: comparing the scores of the parents and the children. In the 
PAT€R-2007 survey, a larger number of questions were tested, notably concerning attitudes 
to risk: the statistical treatments show that above about sixty questions, the marginal 
contribution of an additional item hardly increases the consistency and relevance of the score. 
The internal consistency of the score for time preference is weaker than that of risk 
(Cronbach’s alpha reaches 0.55 at most), which shows that this parameter concerning a 
preference “of a higher order” is indeed more difficult to capture. 
The score for altruism and impatience are constructed with a much smaller number of 
questions, which partly explains the relative weakness of the consistency index, varying 
positively with both the number of items and their covariance. From 2007, however, a 
doubling in the number of questions (about fifteen) led to more acceptable values of 
Cronbach’s alpha (0.45). 
Principal Components Analysis of the score for risk 
Graph A1 displays, for the waves PAT€R-2007 to 2011, the projection of all the questions 
considered to construct the score for risk in the circle of correlations defined by the first two 
axes of the PCA. We have also projected, as an extra variable, the selected score for risk (in 
four quartiles). 
The three graphs show that the projection of scores is aligned with the first axis, for all the 
surveys. Therefore, the questions do indeed share a common dimension in relation to risk 
taking. Note also that the items most highly correlated with the score are those that best 
explain the first axis. Conversely, the items closest to the centre of the circle of correlations 
are the ones that contribute the least to the score, or which have even been eliminated.  
So the information provided by the score is very close to that given by the first axis of a PCA 
of the questions considered to measure individual attitudes to risk.  
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Bar charts of preference measures 
Graphs A2 and A3 represent the distributions of the scores for risk and time preference based 
on the data from the waves PAT€R-2007 to 2011. They show a strong similarity in 
distributions between different years for attitudes to risk and time preference. Compared with 
other measures of preferences - lotteries (see Table A3) or scales (see Graphs A4 and A5) -, 
which only allow to classify the population into a few categories, we can see that the scoring 
method achieves distributions of individual preferences with a much broader spectrum and a 
smoother form: Graphs A4 and A5, representing the distributions of scales of risk and time 
preference, are much more erratic, with peaks on focal values (notably 5). 
Content of the preference scores  
Tables 2 and 3 list, in the surveys PAT€R-2007 to 2011, for risk and time preference, the 
fifteen questions that contribute the most to the scores (the most highly correlated with the 
rest of the scores). The “content” of the scores appears to be very comparable, since the 
rankings of most the questions most relevant to explaining preference measures are very 
similar from one year to the next. For attitudes to risk, for example, the top three questions 
appear in the same order in all three waves. 
Time correlations of preference measures 
Table A2 gives us some idea of the consistency of preference measures from one wave to the 
next for the same individuals (panel samples).  It is the scores which have the strongest time 
correlations: nearly 0.75 between two years, and still 0.70 between PAT€R 2007 and 2011. 
The time correlations are weakest for scales and lotteries, revealing stronger variability in the 
replies to the questions by the same respondents. Table A3 showing the distribution of the 
population according to the replies to the lottery of Barsky et al. (1997) provides a striking 
illustration: more than one third of the most risk-loving individuals were no longer risk-loving 
two years later. Although the time interval (2 years) is quite long, this instability shows the 
inability of the lottery method to pass the test-retest hurdle. 
 
Insee 1998 
(methodological 
survey)
Sofres 2002 (35-
55 years old)
Sofres 2007 Sofres 2009 Sofres 2010
Sample size 1!135 2!460 3!826 3!783 3!616
Panel 2002-2007  
(798 observations) 
Panel 2002-2007-
2009 (600 
observations) 
Panel 2007-2009-
2011 (1087 
observations) 
2 spouses 
interviewied       
(905 couples)
Panel 2007-2009 
(2234 observations) 
Panel 2009-2011 
(1970 observations) 
Number of questions for 
the scores
80 50 115 90 90
Risk lottery on income 
(Barsky et al., 1997)
- Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scales Yes - Yes Yes Yes
Experimental measures - - 400 subjects - -
Source : PAT!R 1998-2002-2007-2009-2011
Specific characteristics -
2 adult generations 
interviewied (440 
pairs parents-
children)
Table 1 : Available PAT!R surveys
Rank 
2009
Rank 
2007
Risk tolerant Risk averse Neutral
1 44,7 53,3 2,0
1 45,8 52,8 1,4
2 17,5 32,3 50,2
2 14,9 37,0 48,1
3 8,1 53,1 38,8
3 8,2 36,9 55,0
6 7,1 16,3 76,7
4 7,6 16,2 76,2
7 23,5 33,6 42,9
5 26,3 31,3 42,4
 8 17,7 10,5 71,8
6 20,9 9,0 70,1
4 16,9 35,7 47,4
7 14,8 34,3 51,0
12 10,0 6,1 83,1
8 16,0 4,8 79,3
9 24,4 33,9 41,7
9 22,2 36,7 41,1
5 18,3 52,6 29,1
10 17,2 55,9 26,9
Source : PATER 2007 and 2009
Has taken risks in their career, and/or sports and/or 
sexual activities
  (Yes, often = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Have practiced the following sports :  off-piste skiing, 
parapenting,  microlighting, parachuting, bungee 
jumpin, mountaineering, rock-climbing, rafting or 
canyoning, diving…
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
 "Marriage is an insurance policy"
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
 "Home ownership ensures that you will always have a 
roof over your head"
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Recommends to close to take risks in their career
  (Yes, often = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
(Yes strongly= + 1; no, not really = - 1; other = 0)
Tables 2 : Top ten questions contributing to the risk score
Top ten 2009
Takes precautions in case the weather turns out nasty
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Wears seatbelt, respects speed limit, respects traffic 
light
(Yes, very often, often = - 1 ; no, never or rarely = + 1 ; 
other = 0)
Parks in forbidden zones
(Yes, very often, often = - 1 ; no, never or rarely = + 1 ; 
other = 0)
Sacrifice today pleasures of life in order to live longer
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Thinks that homogamy explains longevity of the 
couples (same income, social origin, political 
orientation, religion, tastes…)
Rank 
2009
Rank 
2007
Live from day 
to day
Farsighted Neutral
2 21,3 21,7 57,0
1 24,4 21,2 54,4
4 13,8 21,6 64,6
2 15,5 21,0 63,5
1 4,9 43,4 51,7
3 4,3 45,2 50,5
6 12,6 22,3 65,1
4 14,0 20,0 66,0
7 7,1 16,3 76,7
5 7,6 16,2 76,2
3 4,2 37,2 58,7
6 4,8 35,0 60,2
11 31,6 64,9 3,5
7 37,9 59,6 2,5
10 27,1 18,7 54,3
8 25,4 23,2 51,4
12 42,9 57,1
9 44,2 55,8
14 8,8 27,7 63,6
10 8,3 29,0 62,7
Source : PATER 2007 and 2009
Does the possibility that you could end up your life in a 
nursing home preoccupy you ?
  (Yes = - 1 ; other= 0)
Buys transport tickets well in advance
  (No = +1; well in advance = -1; a little in advance = 0)
Your children refuse to give up their leisure activities, 
hobbies or friends for their studies. Do you agree?
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
I am someone who makes plans for the future
 (No = +1; Yes = -1; Other = 0)
Would prefer early retirement against a lower pension 
after the age of 65
 (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0)
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Tables 3 : Top ten questions contributing to the time preference score
Top ten 2009
"Retirement has to be prepared well in advance"
(Yes = - 1; no, I have time = + 1 ; other = 0)
Careful to keep in shape
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
We should teach children and teenagers how to save 
money
  (Yes = + 1 ; no = - 1 ; other= 0)
Plan his holidays well in advance
(No = -1; Yes, well in time = +1; a little in advance = 0)
Sacrifice today pleasures of life in order to live longer
Risk score PAT!R 1998 PAT!R 2002 PAT!R 2007 PAT!R 2009 PAT!R 2011
Income (-) Non linear Non linear Non linear Non linear
Age + + + + +
Gender : female + + + + +
Familial status Married : + Married : + Married : + Married : + Married : +
Social origin Self-employed : - Self-employed : - Self-employed : - Self-employed : -
Education - 0 - 0 0
Children at home 0 0 (-) 0 0
Children away from home 0 0 (-) (-)
Numbers of observations 1 135 2 460 3 825 3 782 3 616
Source : PAT!R 1998-2002-2007-2009-2011
Preference for the present PAT!R 1998 PAT!R 2002 PAT!R 2007 PAT!R 2009 PAT!R 2011
Income 0 - - - -
Age - - - - -
Gender : female 0 0 - - -
Familial status Married: - Married: - Married : - Married : - Married : -
Social origin 0 0 0 1
Education - - - - -
Children at home 0 (+) (+) (+) 0
Children away from home (-) 0 0 0
Intergenerationnal transfers 
received
(-) - - - -
Numbers of observations 1 135 2 460 3 825 3 782 3 616
Source : PAT!R 1998-2002-2007-2009-2011
Note : Variables statistically significant at 5% ;  in (  ) at 10% . + : less risk tolerant
Note : Variables statistically significant at 5% ;  in (  ) at 10% . + : less far-sighted
Table 4 :  Determinants of the risk score
Table 5 :  Determinants of the time preference score
Scores 2007 Risk averse
Preference for 
the present
Impatient Familial altruism
Risk averse 1,00 -0,44 -0,33 0,30
Preference for the present 1,00 0,26 -0,30
Impatient 1,00 -0,11
Family altruism 1,00
Scores 2009
Risk averse 1,00 -0,37 -0,34 0,33
Preference for the present 1,00 0,21 -0,25
Impatient 1,00 -0,16
Family altruism 1,00
Scores 2011
Risk averse 1,00 -0,40 -0,36 0,29
Preference for the present 1,00 0,20 -0,29
Impatient 1,00 -0,12
Family altruism 1,00
Note : Correlations statistically significant at 5% level are in  bold .
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011
Table 6 : Correlations between preference scores
Preference pour le présentt
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011 (cross section data)
Figure 1 : Time preference score and wealth accumulation (econometric effects of scores between 1rst and 4th quartile)
145 
137 
66 66 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
Financial wealth Gross wealth 
Far-sighted 
Short-sighted 
2007 
149 
136 
69 71 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
Financial wealth Gross wealth 
Far-sighted 
Short-sighted 
2009 
136 
129 
74 
61 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
Financial wealth Gross wealth 
Far-sighted 
Short-sighted 
2011 
Note : Marginal effects of a variation of one standard deviation on the probability of ownership. 
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011 (cross section data)
Main residence Life insurance
Figure 2 : Preference scores and portfolio choice 
Equities Liquid saving Annuities
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Survey PAT!R 1998 PAT!R 2002 PAT!R 2007 PAT!R 2009 PAT!R 2011
Cronbach's alpha 0,65 0,51 0,68 0,67 0,66
Items retained/Total 
Items
54/56 27/32 57/65 52/58 53/58
Cronbach's alpha 0,53 0,40 0,56 0,54 0,54
Items retained/Total 
Items
25/34 16/18 27/34 23/30 23/30
Cronbach's alpha 0,29 0,37 0,45 0,40 0,44
Items retained/Total 
Items
8/9 7/8 13/14 13/14 13/14
Cronbach's alpha 0,27 0,28 0,47 0,44 0,44
Items retained/Total 
Items
8/13 3/3 16/16 16/16 16/16
Source : PAT!R 1998-2002-2007-2009-2011
Short term impatience
Risk
Time preference
Tables A1 : Cronbach's alpha of scores in the 4 PAT!R surveys
Family altruism
2002-2007 2002-2009 2007-2009 2007-2011 2009-2011
0.57 0.51 0.75 0,69 0,74
0.46 0.36 0.66 0,60 0,67
0.28 0.27 0.30 0,30 0,31
0.32 0,29 0,47
0.54 0,49 0,53
798 600 2234 1 179 1 970
Source : PAT!R 1998-2002-2007-2009-2011
Risk scales
Time preference scales
Number of observations
Table A2 : Correlations of scores across waves
Risk scores
Time preference scores
Risk lottery
2009 !>3,76 2=<!<3,76 1=<!<2 !<1
!>3,76 73,4% 41,4% 37,0% 41,2% 1061
2=<!<3,76 13,6% 38,1% 25,6% 12,8% 425
1=<!<2 10,2% 16,6% 29,8% 23,0% 320
!<1 2,8% 3,9% 7,6% 23,0% 107
Number of observations 894 488 383 148 1913
2011 !>3,76 2=<!<3,76 1=<!<2 !<1
!>3,76 74,2% 48,2% 37,4% 34,5% 1023
2=<!<3,76 14,2% 34,6% 30,7% 21,2% 358
1=<!<2 8,9% 13,0% 24,0% 25,7% 221
!<1 2,8% 4,1% 7,9% 18,6% 82
Number of observations 979 338 254 113 1684
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011
2009
Number of 
observations
Table A3 : Distribution across waves  of the hypothetical lottery measure
Percent  choosing response (%)
2007
Number of 
observations
Percent  choosing response (%)
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011 (cross section data)
Figure A1 : Principal Components Analysis of the risk score 
2007 2009 
2011 
Preference pour le présentt
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011 (cross section data)
Figure A2 : Histogram of the risk score Figure A3 : Histogram of the time score
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Preference pour le présentt
Source : PAT!R 2007-2009-2011 (cross section data)
Figure A4 : Histogram of risk the scale Figure A5 : Histogram of the time scale
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